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Abstract: Canadian provincial governments continue to own and operate a host of public 
enterprises. While many Crowns have been privatized or eliminated, governments continue to 
rely on remaining Crowns to meet specific policy and political objectives. This article analyzes 
three contemporary provincially-owned and operated Crowns - BC Ferries, the Liquor Control 
Board of Ontario and ATB Financial - and sets out to examine both why they continue to be 
publicly owned as well as their institutional evolutions as all three firms have reorganized their 
internal operations and the ways in which they are governed. These firms are relatively secure in 
their current condition since they all confer material advantages onto particular groups while 
providing politically important services to their governing superiors;  any changes to their 
ownership structures would require a significant amount of energy, yet would yield marginal 
gains. The centralized decision-making structures within provincial governments, strong path 
dependencies, iterative incremental changes to these firms’ operations and governance regimes,  
are all key factors shaping their respective lifecycle evolutions. These three public institutions 
help governments to meet key obligations and avoid potential political problems that are specific 
to their provincial contexts.    
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Resumé: Les gouvernements provinciaux canadiens continuent de détenir et de gérer une 
multitude d'entreprises publiques. Bien que de nombreuses sociétés d'État ont été privatisées ou 
éliminées, les gouvernements continuent de dépendre sur les sociétés d'État restantes pour 
répondre à des politiques spécifiques et pour des fins politiques. Cet article analyse trois sociétés 
d'État contemporaines qui sont détenues et gérées par certaines provinces – les traversiers de la 
Colombie-Britannique [BC Ferries], la Régie des alcools de l'Ontario [Liquor Control Board of 
Ontario] et les succursales du Trésor de la province de l’Alberta [ATB Financial] - et examine à 
la fois pourquoi ces sociétés d’État continuent d’être de propriété publique ainsi que leurs 
évolutions institutionnelles considérant que ces trois entreprises ont réorganisé leurs opérations 
internes et les façons dont elles sont gouvernées. Ces entreprises sont plus ou moins stables dans 
leurs formes actuelles parce qu’elles confèrent d'importants avantages à des groupes particuliers 
tout en fournissant des avantages politiques pour leurs dirigeants; par ailleurs, toute modification 
de la structure de propriété de ces entreprises requerrait un important effort, mais résulterait dans 
des gains marginaux. Afin d’apprécier l’évolution du cycle de vie de chacune de ces entreprises, 
les facteurs importants suivants sont à considérer: la dépendance historique, les changements 
progressifs et itératifs à leurs opérations et modes de gouvernance, ainsi que les effets de la 
structure centralisée des décisions des gouvernements provinciaux. Ces trois institutions 
publiques aident le gouvernement à remplir des obligations importantes et à éviter des problèmes 
politiques possibles qui sont spécifiques à leurs contextes provinciaux. 
Mots-Clés: société de la Couronne; sociétés d’État; politique publique provinciale  
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“Everywhere the state remains in business, and everywhere the state seeks to be more 
businesslike”i  
 
Drs. Jeanne Kirk Laux and Maureen 
Molot in the last line of their 1988 book on 
state-owned enterprises make two apt points 
regarding the state of contemporary 
Canadian governance. While there is little 
debate that the state in Canada and 
throughout the world is striving to be more 
“businesslike” in their operations, a fact 
lauded by some, lamented by others, it is the 
first part of their insight which is overlooked 
by many who study Canadian public policy. 
Despite a wave privatizations and, in some 
cases, eliminations, of Canadian Crown 
corporations, our governments at all levels 
continue to own and operate a host of 
businesses engaged in a wide range of 
activities. Even after a number of high-
profile privatizations of Crowns at the 
federal level, Air Canada and Canadian 
National Railways, as well as at the 
provincial level, Manitoba Telecom Services 
and the Alberta Liquor Control Board, being 
among the most notable, publicly owned 
firms still account for 3.4% of Canada’s 
GDP (Crisan and McKenzie, 2013: 26). This 
essay is a modest attempt to fill a gap in 
Canada’s public policy literature and it does 
so by drawing insights from the evolutions 
of three provincial Crown corporations - 
British Columbia Ferry Services Inc. (BC 
Ferries), the Liquor Control Board of 
Ontario (LCBO) and ATB Financial - and 
seeks to answer two basic questions: Why 
are these Crowns still publicly owned and 
how have they modernized their operations 
over the course of their lifecycles?
ii
    
 Its central premise is that these three 
firms are deeply embedded into political, 
economic and cultural fabric of their 
respective home provinces. Such an 
embedded state is due largely to the fact that 
they help their single shareholders resolve 
critical collective action problems in their 
respective jurisdictions as well as aid them 
in avoiding potential problems in the future. 
Whether it is providing marine transport on 
the west coast, ensuring financial stability in 
Alberta or, in the case of Ontario, earning 
revenues, responsibly selling alcohol and 
promoting locally-made products, these 
three firms provide indispensable services to 
their political superiors.  Further, it will 
illustrate how these companies are not static 
entities, but rather are dynamic firms that 
have dramatically modernized both their 
day-to-day operations as well as the manner 
in which they are governed, in addition to 
outlining the rationales behind these 
modernization efforts. Such a deep 
entrenchment in each province is due not 
only to their specific policy functions, but 
also to the structure of Canadian 
governments and their decision-making 
capacities that limit radical pro-active policy 
decisions such that there is little chance that 
these firms will be privatized or eliminated 
in the near future.  
The evolution of these three firms 
also illustrates a void in both an empirical 
and a theoretical sense within the Canadian 
public policy literature. On one hand, and in 
contrast to the critics of publicly-owned 
firms (Iacobucci and Trebilcock, 2012), they 
illustrate that publicly-owned companies can 
be dynamic and efficient providers of 
services and, on the other hand, they also 
demonstrate the capacity of public firms to 
resist the onslaught of “neo-liberal” 
challenges, best exemplified by 
privatization, accompanying a general 
weakening of the public sector in response 
to the forces of globalized capital (McBride, 
2005). While there is some relatively recent 
work on English Canadian Crowns 
(Bellamy, 2005; Boardman et al., 2009; 
Campbell, 2002) as well as work by the 
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author (Bird, 2010a, 2010b, 2013, 2015a, 
2015b) this is in addition to a few pieces on 
the modernization of these firms (Stewart, 
2008; McInerney and Barrows, 2000), much 
of the other work on Canadian Crowns is 
over twenty years old and is focused on 
questions surrounding privatization (Tupper 
and Doern, 1988; Rea and Wiseman, 1985). 
The three cases presented here are also an 
attempt to integrate the Canadian experience 
with contemporary state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) with the wider international 
literature on the public ownership of firms 
whereby direct state intervention into the 
marketplace through a variety of means, not 
simply with the lumbering “Leviathans” of 
yesteryear, is making a comeback, 
particularly in a number of developing 
countries such as Brazil and China 
(Bremmer, 2010; Musacchio and Lazzarini, 
2014).   
This article will be organized in the 
following manner. The first section will 
briefly outline the decision-making ethos of 
provincial governments - such a general 
analysis is necessary since it shapes the 
context in which governments relate to their 
Crowns (as well as being the central reason 
why the elimination or privatization of these 
firms is highly unlikely). Next, it will 
present our three cases and briefly describe 
their histories and evolutions. Once this is 
established, the article will then explain how 
the Crowns have modernized their 
operations and how they are governed. Then  
the raw political dynamics that surround the 
firms, various stakeholders, and their single 
shareholder will be concisely analyzed. 
Some concluding remarks will round out the 
article.   
Acceptance of State Ownership and 
Decision-Making in Provincial 
Governments  
This paper argues, and has solid 
empirical evidence to support the 
supposition, that all of these Crowns will 
remain in the public sphere for the 
foreseeable future. They exist because they 
meet critical policy and political needs of 
their respective political superiors within 
their given provincial contexts. In the recent 
past, governments in all three provinces, it is 
worth noting, have set out to restructure the 
provincial state by attempting to reduce the 
size and scope of the public sector through a 
variety of means such as tax reductions and 
eliminating public organizations, often 
through the privatization of Crown 
corporations during the 1990s and early 
2000s. Such efforts were characteristic of 
the governments of Gordon Campbell, 
Ralph Klein and Mike Harris (Carrol and 
Ratner, 2005; Bruce et al. 1997 and Ibbitson, 
1997, respectively) that, despite imposing 
significant austerity measures, did not opt to 
sell-off these firms. Evidently, they shied 
away from such plans because the financial 
and/or political benefits of privatizing these 
firms was not as great as the realized gains 
from such a move. Despite calls for the 
further privatization or scaling back of the 
role of Crown corporations in the Canadian 
economy (Bergevin and Poschmann, 2013) 
this is unlikely to occur with these firms (or 
any other Crowns) in the foreseeable future. 
Readers must accept the fact that political 
considerations of governments trump any 
ideological, theoretical or any other 
rationales that call for the elimination of 
publicly-owned firms and the corresponding 
set of arguments that claim that private firms 
in competitive markets are a superior 
alternative to their publicly-owned 
counterparts. Readers need to recognize 
these firms’ political, economic and, even to 
some degree, moral legitimacy as publicly-
owned and operated corporate entities. 
Analysis of these firms, in short, needs to 
move past the subject of privatization since 
it is a moot issue. Once readers appreciate 
the historical and political context of each 
firm, it will be clear why privatization is a 
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politically implausible policy option for the 
governments of these three provinces.    
A brief explanation of the structural 
constraints facing Canadian provincial 
governments will assist in understanding the 
life courses of these companies and their 
relationships to their political masters.  
While some academics argue that political 
power is highly centralized in the upper 
echelons of the senior executive of Canadian 
governments (Savoie, 1999; Simpson, 2001) 
this fact, however, does not mean that 
majority governments are not highly 
constrained in their behavior. The 
corresponding image which such views 
evoke is that the first minister’s office looms 
ominously over subordinate components of 
the state be they the legislature, civil service, 
Crowns and the like. Such an image is 
problematic since it fails to account for the 
day-to-day realities of life for governments 
in power. Rather, it is best to think of senior 
executive offices not as an omnipotent 
dominant entity, but instead as a besieged 
fort, surrounded by hostile enemies who are 
lobbing a constant stream of serious 
problems at the government. The most basic 
and perpetual set of problems that all 
governments face is a never ending demand 
for more public goods and services without a 
corresponding willingness to pay higher 
taxes. Added to this condition are the acute 
problems that arise on a daily basis, such as 
plant closings, strikes, natural disasters, 
scandals and the like, all of which require 
effective political management - all of this is 
occurring in an environment increasingly 
characterized by instant communications 
and oftentimes a hostile media. Canadian 
governments, then, spend the vast majority 
of their energies in a reactionary mode and 
have limited capacities for proactive policy 
creation; at best, a government might have 
two or three policy arenas where they can 
initiate change. In the cases of these Crowns, 
and why they continue to exist, one key 
reason is that governments simply do not 
have the capacity to alter their ownership 
structures without getting involved with 
what could potentially become a set of bitter 
conflicts with many entrenched interests. In 
terms of their day-to-day operations, Crown 
firms help governments to resolve key 
collective action problems as well as prevent 
others from developing and, so long as they 
are fulfilling their mandates (and not 
bringing any undue attention to themselves 
or the government), they are largely left to 
their own devices. Governments, much like 
individuals, do not get up in the morning 
seeking to create more problems for 
themselves than they already face.  
The Case Studies: BC Ferries, ATB 
Financial and the LCBO  
BC Ferries is a provider of marine 
ferry transportation services on British 
Columbia’s west coast. It operates 25 routes 
and 47 terminals, has a fleet of 36 ships and 
employs over 3,400 individuals. In 2013, it 
moved 19.7 million passengers and 7.6 
million vehicles, and its total operational 
costs that year were $714.3 million (British 
Columbia Ferry Services Inc., 2014). It is 
headquartered in Victoria, BC, and is a 
highly visible, politically significant 
organization since over one-third of the 
province’s population is dependent on its 
services.  
The LCBO is a liquor retailing 
behemoth. In 2012, it operated 623 retail 
stores and sold over $4.7 billion of beer, 
wine and spirits, returning over $1.63 billion 
to the provincial government (LCBO, 2012). 
It employs almost 7,000 individuals and 
approximately one half (by value) of 
Ontario’s beverage alcohol flows through its 
store network. Based in Toronto, it is a 
dynamic retailer, considered the market 
leader in terms of marketing innovations and 
providing a high quality retailing 
environment, and is very well regarded by 
its customers (Deloitte and Touche, 2005). 
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ATB Financial is a deposit-taking 
financial institution fully owned by the 
Alberta government – a bank for all intents 
and purposes. In 2013, it had 171 retail 
locations, approximately 5,000 employees 
and over $27.3 billion in deposits and $33.9 
billion in outstanding loans (ATB Financial, 
2014). It is headquartered in Edmonton and 
since its reorganization in the late 1990s, 
ATB has been expanding its presence 
throughout the province. Both the LCBO 
and ATB Financial are dynamic public 
institutions that have relatively bright futures 
and do not face the same structurally 
imposed challenges as their west coast 
counterpart, BC Ferries. Three tables of key 
operational and financial statistics are 
included in this paper’s appendix.       
Early Historical Development   
 These three public firms and the 
functions they perform are deeply embedded 
within the economic, political, social, and 
cultural fabric of their respective provinces. 
Each was created to address a set of 
politically significant policy objectives that, 
for the most part, continue to be relevant 
today. However, as with any institution, they 
have needed to adapt to a changing context 
and have undergone substantial 
organizational reforms – usually in an 
incremental manner (Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010). BC Ferries was created in 1960 by 
W.A.C. Bennett’s Social Credit government 
as a key component of its efforts to develop 
the province through substantial public 
infrastructure investments, particularly those 
in the transportation sector, in order to 
promote the growth of private business and 
overall economic expansion (Leonard, 
2002). Bennett, a very successful 
businessman prior to entering politics, 
understood that the two private firms which 
provided key ferry services would not 
(despite efforts to convince them otherwise) 
invest in ferry infrastructure nor provide 
frequent levels of service to meet the needs 
of the nascent province. The federal 
government’s refusal to resolve a labour 
strike at Canadian Pacific’s ferry service and 
the threat of a sympathy strike by workers 
from the American-owned alternate firm 
were motivating factors that illustrated the 
need for a provincially-owned and operated 
ferry provider (Obee, 2008).    
ATB Financial was created in 1937 
by William A. Aberhart’s Social Credit 
government as a means to provide secure 
credit to its beleaguered depression-era 
farmers. Its acronym originally stood for the 
“Alberta Treasury Branch” and it was an 
effort to bring the security and stability of 
the Alberta government’s finance 
department to the aid of the province’s 
inhabitants during the depression (ATB, 
1998). The LCBO was created in 1927 as a 
politically viable solution to the failed 
experiment with province-wide prohibition. 
Under this new regime, it would be the 
province that would sell alcohol under the 
“watchful eyes” of its new liquor board 
which embraced its role in limiting the sale 
and consumption of alcoholic beverages 
(Heron, 2003: 277). The additional revenues 
derived from this new line of business were 
welcomed by the Ontario government of the 
day (Schull, 1978: 277). While the liquor 
board has evolved considerably over the 
course of its existence (promoting Ontario-
made alcoholic beverages and high value 
products are among the key changes), 
revenue generation and socially responsible 
distribution of its products continue to be 
important policy demands from the Ontario 
government.  
Each Crown was created to fulfill a 
pressing political need of the government of 
the day, and such needs stemmed from the 
unique political context of each province. 
Whether it was BC’s marine location and 
W.A.C. Bennett’s desire to engage in 
“province building” (Tomblin, 1990); 
Alberta’s agricultural roots, the wrath of the 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 2, 2015 pp. 1-20 
6 
 
depression and its corresponding sense of 
alienation from central Canadian capitalist 
interests, particularly the banks 
(Macpherson, 1953); or Ontario and its 
strong temperance movement derived from 
its staunchly protestant roots (Schull, 1978), 
these Crowns were products of their 
temporal and geographic contexts.  
Correspondingly, they have evolved over the 
course of their existences in ways that hark 
back to their historical origins and have 
simultaneously served to further embed 
themselves into the fabric of their home 
provinces.     
Modernizing the Crowns: Slow and 
Steady Evolutions  
 Following their creation, these firms 
set about to fulfill their original functions as 
was intended by their overseeing 
governments. This is not to imply that they 
have remained static, rather, they all have 
undergone processes of modernizing both in 
the way in which they conduct their 
businesses and the manner in which they are 
governed. These modernization drives, for 
the most part, have occurred over long 
stretches of time and were incremental and 
iterative in nature with changes occurring  
gradually through specific episodes whereby 
key organizational and governance shifts 
were initiated. For much of BC Ferries’ 
early life, for instance, it was under the 
direct control of the provincial government, 
operating as a division of the highways 
department and was subject to a significant 
degree of politicized involvement in its daily 
operations – there was a good reason as to 
why it was referred to as “Bennett’s Navy.” 
But, over its life course, it evolved to be 
more independent of the government, 
starting in 1976 when it became a Crown 
corporation with the passage of its own 
enabling legislation, the British Columbia 
Ferries Act, 1977. Throughout the 1980s it 
continued to expand its operations, due to 
both organic growth and it acquiring the 
saltwater ferry division of the Ministry of 
Highways in 1985. Much of its efforts 
during the 1990s was spent consolidating 
and integrating its operations into one, 
unified ferry firm. Further wholesale 
governance and operational reforms 
culminated in April 2003 with a new piece 
of legislation, The Coastal Ferries Act, 
2003, which was an attempt to further 
distance the government from this firm by 
overhauling its governance regime in an 
effort to establish BC Ferries as an 
independent operating entity (Stewart, 
2008); such an overhaul was both a response 
to the structural challenges that BC Ferries 
faces, principally declining user rates, and 
the outcome of an ill-fated effort to build 
three aluminum catamaran ferries (Bird, 
2015a).  
In a similar vein, the LCBO’s 
modernization process took place over a 25 
year period and, while it is difficult to 
pinpoint a clear initiation date, in 1984 the 
provincial government appointed Jack 
Ackroyd head of the board with instructions 
to analyze its operations and devise a reform 
strategy, but it was not until late 1987 that 
the entire executive, including the board of 
directors, was removed and replaced with 
new individuals. On the political front, a 
milestone event was when then premier 
David Peterson in 1985 refused to sign 
order-in-council documents to appoint liquor 
store clerks, remarking at the absurdity of a 
leader of modern state being tasked with 
such a petty duty. Finally, ATB Financial 
was officially reorganized in the late 1990s 
with the introduction of the Alberta 
Treasury Branches Act, 1997, that 
established it as a Crown corporation with 
an independent board of directors and set a 
series of operational reforms in motion. The 
central motivation for restructuring ATB 
Financial was to prepare it for eventual 
privatization. As well, a number of high 
profile scandals earlier in the decade 
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illustrated that without drastic organizational 
change it would continue to be a political 
liability for the government; a number of 
external reviews, furthermore, argued 
convincingly that substantial organization 
changes were needed at the company (Flynn, 
1994; Otto and Murray, 1997). The 
government reneged on its plan to privatize 
the Crown corporation after receiving ardent 
opposition from the rural caucus of the 
ruling Conservative Party.  
Modernizing the Crowns: 
Governance Regimes: All three firms have 
modernized the way in which they relate to 
their political superiors. The most critical 
shift in their governance regimes has been a 
clear delineation between the daily business 
operations of each firm and the political and 
policy needs of the government. Prior to the 
modernizing efforts at these Crowns, there 
was a significant amount of interference in 
their business operations from the political 
sphere; oftentimes with partisan or personal 
gains being the central motivating factors. 
Such politicalized intrusions at these firms 
as well as outdated operating procedures  
meant that “rent seeking” by various 
individuals and groups was all too common.  
Such efforts took many forms: at the LCBO, 
for instance, patronage appointments were 
rife throughout all sectors of the liquor 
board; product offerings and store locations 
were decisions shaped by the personal or 
political interests of the government rather 
than any business case rationales (Mercer, 
1986)
iii
. Similar dynamics were at play 
within ATB Financial, whereby loans and 
other financial services were provided to 
clients without industry standard due-
diligence procedures, and were often 
provided to individuals with close 
connections to the ruling party. Similarly to 
the LCBO, patronage was prevalent at the 
Alberta-based financial institution.  Similar 
problems plagued BC Ferries where ferry 
schedules and tariff rates were made within 
the political sphere where partisan and 
personal interests, rather than business 
concerns, were paramount.  
This type of interference in their 
business affairs has come to an end. 
Governments, as is their right as the single 
shareholder, can set the long-term policy 
goals of these firms, but they must not 
meddle in their daily business activities. 
This evolution, it is worth noting, serves 
both parties well. Any form of patronage, for 
instance, undermines a firms’ capacity to 
hire capable individuals based on their 
qualifications (as well as complicating 
employee retention and promotion policies) 
and inconsistent policy demands from 
governments also make long-term business 
planning much more difficult for senior 
executives. Conversely, governments 
recognize the political risks associated with 
potential blowback from a weak patronage 
appointment choice, or from influencing a 
firm’s behavior for non-commercial 
motives, particularly if well-connected 
individual(s) benefit from a particular 
transaction. All business-related operations 
have been formalized and resemble 
procedures followed at congruent private 
companies and are well insulated from any 
intrusions from members of the government. 
The LCBO and ATB Financial, for example, 
resemble their private sector counterparts in 
terms of the division of powers and 
responsibilities between the shareholder, the 
board of directors, and the senior executives 
– taking into account their unique public 
sector mandates. BC Ferries is governed in a 
manner that formally restricts the 
government’s influence over the firm: the 
government’s shares in the firm are held by 
a holding company, the BC Ferry Authority; 
the composition of its board of directors is 
prescribed in its enabling legislation (which 
reduces the provincial government’s input as 
to its membership); and its fares are set by 
an independent board, the BC Ferry 
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Commission (Stewart, 2008). These changes 
within BC Ferries are attempts to de-
politicize decisions regarding fare increases 
and service levels through the use of an 
external actor that draws on rational 
accounting methods to justify any changes 
to service schedules and prices. In all three 
cases, the critical litmus test for operational 
independence is the ability of their senior 
executives to have both the confidence and 
the capacity to resist any attempts by a 
government, or its constituent parts, to 
unduly shape their day-to-day commercial 
behavior, and to be able to do so without 
fear of any potential reprisals to their 
actions. The executives at all three firms 
have this capacity.    
Modernizing the Crowns: Operations: All 
three firms have undergone profound 
changes to their organization structures and 
operations. All aspects of their businesses – 
logistics, marketing, procurement, human 
resources, finances and the like - have been 
formalized in terms of developing 
standardized policies and procedures, 
resulting in much more efficient and 
effective operations such that they now 
would resemble congruent functions at 
contemporary private sector firms.  In many 
cases, the changes were implemented by a 
new cadre of senior executives who were 
brought in from the private sector to 
implement modernization plans, and who 
focused their efforts on improving the 
customers’ overall experience as well as 
introducing standard corporate accounting, 
financial management, and business 
planning procedures. In 2003, BC Ferries 
hired David Hahn, an American executive 
from the aviation sector, to lead its 
revitalization. Hahn put great emphasis on 
improving the user experience by placing 
great importance on schedule punctuality, 
ensuring that the washrooms were clean, and 
that onboard restaurants and shops were 
providing good value among many other 
initiatives. Similarly, Larry Gee, a former 
senior executive at Dominion Stores, lead 
the modernization efforts at the LCBO 
throughout the 1990s and understood the 
importance of appealing to female customers 
and developing a uniform brand image for 
the provincial liquor board, among many 
other operational improvements. Likewise, 
huge efforts were made by all of the Crown 
firms to professionalize their work forces to 
ensure that they had adequate training and 
the necessary skills to perform their duties. 
At ATB Financial, for instance, it was 
crucial that staff members improve their 
skill sets, particularly with regards to 
acquiring formal credentials, required in a 
modern financial institution. Improving 
employee knowledge, particularly in areas 
of product information and in selling alcohol 
in a socially responsible manner, were key 
improvements at Ontario’s liquor board. 
Fundamental changes to all three of these 
firms’ corporate cultures to be focused on 
providing high levels of consumer value as 
well as operating in an efficient manner 
were key components of these 
modernization efforts since, prior to these 
reforms, these firms were less concerned 
with these aspects of their operations as one 
might expect from a modern-day company.  
The LCBO in particular was in a 
state of serious decrepitude. It had, for 
instance, no loss prevention department, nor 
did it have any electronic accounting or 
inventory management capacities by the late 
1980s; store-by-store product movement 
reports took six months to reach senior 
management. At least part of the reason for 
such dysfunction was limited capital 
resources; in 1987, for example, capital 
spending for the entire board was $11.5 
million (LCBO, 1987: 16). BC Ferries, 
likewise, faced significant problems. Until 
organizational reforms were implemented in 
the 1990s, it was difficult for its managers to 
do any long-term business planning since its 
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operational subsidies were provided on a 
yearly, ad hoc basis by the provincial 
government who simply provided funds to 
cover the shortfall between their revenues 
and costs. Similarly, long-term capital 
spending planning at the ferry corporation 
was made difficult by obscure directions 
from the BC government.  Despite the 
challenges that these executives faced, 
slowly, but surely, they set out to reform 
every aspect of the firms’ operations and, in 
the end, were remarkably successful at these 
endeavors.    
While the modernization processes at 
all three firms underscored an emphasis on 
improving their “commercial” orientations - 
reducing costs, increasing productivity and 
improving their overall operations and the 
like - such efforts were tempered by their 
political and policy mandates from their 
political superiors. At the LCBO, for 
instance, increasing remittances to the 
provincial government was one central 
motivation for instituting organizational 
reforms, but the liquor board was to do this 
without increasing the volume of alcohol 
moving through its stores. The provincial 
government was (and continues to be) 
deeply concerned with the negative social 
and health costs linked to the consumption 
of alcohol. The LCBO’s solution to this 
rather contradictory directive was to 
promote higher-value alcoholic products 
which would return higher revenues without 
a corresponding congruent increase in the 
volume of alcohol it sold.  The liquor 
board’s concern with selling alcohol in a 
socially responsible manner also justifies its 
limited number of retail locations and 
restricted store hours. At ATB Financial, it 
is mandated only to provide a “fair” return 
to its government shareholder (Government 
of Alberta, 2003: 3) and, at the same time, it 
must continue to fulfill its role of serving 
rural and small-town customers as well as 
continue to be a counter-cyclical, stabilizing 
financial institution in the Alberta economy 
(Ascah, 2011). In practice, the Alberta 
government does not expect any remittances 
from this firm and it has not paid a dividend 
to the province since 1992 (Atkins, 2011: 
23). Given these directives, however, ATB 
Financial must also be careful not expose the 
Alberta government to an unreasonable 
amount of financial liability stemming from 
its business activities. At BC Ferries the goal 
of increasing the commercial nature of its 
operations was to reduce its dependence on 
government subsidies by extracting more 
revenues from its users as well as providing 
a higher-quality experience in order to 
justify the increased fare prices. Such 
efforts, however, were not, nor are able, to 
address the structural challenges this firm 
faces. The central point is that the 
modernization processes these firms 
underwent were not simply to increase 
revenues and corresponding profits, or to 
reduce subsidy requirements (though these 
were key concerns to their executives), but 
rather to enable them to better fulfill their 
public policy mandates.    
The Political Dynamics and Future 
Prospects of these Crowns  
 Each of these firms is deeply 
embedded into the political and economic 
fabric as well as the social and cultural 
milieu of their home provinces. Such 
conditions imply that any form of radical 
change, such as elimination or privatization, 
is highly improbable, let alone politically 
impossible, and thus goes to further 
reinforce the strong “path dependent” 
institutional behavior seen at these Crown 
corporations (Pierson, 2000). Such 
embeddedness is best illustrated by the raw 
political dynamics that surround each of 
these firms and the material advantages they 
confer onto particular groups, as well as how 
fulfilling their mandates helps their owner 
governments  avoid potential political 
problems. The political dynamics of these 
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firms are also connected to their future 
prospects; while ATB and the LCBO have 
bright future scenarios, the same cannot be 
said for BC Ferries because it faces some 
significant forthcoming challenges. It is 
worth noting that their future prospects have 
much less to do with the organization itself 
and the ways in which it has modernized 
than it does with the nature of the collective 
action problem each has been charged with 
resolving. Selling alcohol and loaning 
money, not surprisingly, are considerably 
easier tasks to fulfill than moving vehicles 
and people around a marine environment.  
The LCBO, and the configuration of 
the Ontario alcohol retailing market more 
generally, confer significant material 
advantages onto a number of groups. The 
firms that supply the LCBO with its 
products ardently support the current 
configuration of the marketplace. This 
includes the small and large wine and beer 
makers as well as the spirit producers, all of 
whom champion the liquor board because it 
has uniform administrative, financial and 
logistical processes that substantially reduce 
transaction costs. The LCBO provides a 
relatively low-cost retailing conduit when 
compared to a marketplace where there are 
more independent retail actors. A limited 
number of stores, and a finite amount of 
shelf space within those stores, also serves 
to keep potential new entrants - and 
competitors - out of the Ontario alcohol 
market. Ontario’s unique oligopolistic 
alcohol retail market further compounds the 
material advantages for a number of firms.  
The two largest brewers own and operate 
their own 440 store network, aptly named 
the Beer Store, and two large wine 
producers own and operate over two-thirds 
of the 440 wine stores (Lacey et al., 2005). 
A few retail stores attached to producers 
(mostly small brewers) as well as a number 
duty-free stores round out the province’s 
alcohol retailers. It is impossible to acquire a 
new alcohol retailing license. Ontario’s 13.5 
million people have just 1,798 retail outlets 
to purchase alcohol (LCBO 2011: 52).  To 
provide some context, Alberta, which has a 
competitive private retail market, has almost 
2,000 retail locations (Alberta Gaming and 
Liquor Commission, 2013) which serve a 
population one quarter the size of Ontario. 
Both the suppliers of alcohol and the owners 
of alternative retail outlets - a number of 
which are the same firms - are influential 
players in the Ontario political scene that are 
able to ensure that no real changes occur to 
the Ontario liquor retailing regime.    
A retail market with a limited 
number of stores and the LCBO’s efforts to 
sell alcohol in a socially responsible manner 
are two factors which resonate strongly with 
the provincial government. Both the Ontario 
government and the province’s public health 
sector support the current system and do not 
wish to see alcohol more freely available 
(Giesbrecht et al., 2006). Both the LCBO 
itself, and the general structure of the 
Ontario alcohol retail market help to 
promote the Ontario-made wine (Mytelka 
and Goertzen, 2004) as well as the craft beer 
sector, a fact duly noted in its annual reports 
(LCBO, 2012: 4). Its unionized workers, not 
surprisingly, ardently support its continued 
public ownership. Perhaps the most vital 
factor shaping the political dynamics of the 
liquor board is that the citizens of Ontario 
like the LCBO and the service it provides 
(Deloitte and Touche, 2005) and they 
appreciate how it has modernized its retail 
operations, provides a first-rate shopping 
experience complete with helpful and 
knowledgeable staff, beautiful stores, and a 
wide selection of alcoholic products.    
There are two key factors shaping 
the political dynamics surrounding ATB 
Financial. First, it serves rural and small 
town citizens and associated businesses in 
the agricultural and hydrocarbon industries.  
It enjoys widespread support from these 
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constituencies since it has a long tradition of 
providing them with full-service banking 
services and, most critically, loans for their 
businesses, in good and tough economic 
times. It earned a significant amount of 
“goodwill” with many citizens in the 1980s 
when it continued to provide money to 
struggling business and agricultural sectors 
during difficult financial times.  Also, it was 
considerably “gentler” with customers who 
were unable to make their debt payments 
compared to other financial institutions. It is 
this same constituency – rural and small-
town residents – that forms the core of the 
support for the Conservative Party in 
Alberta.   
Second, ATB Financial is a source of 
locally-controlled capital that helps to 
insulate the Alberta business sector from 
capital shortfalls that may result from 
decisions of bankers located in central 
Canada (Ascah, 2011); such shortfalls would 
produce a significant political challenge for 
any Alberta government. As a publicly-
owned entity, ATB strives to increase the 
availability of credit to businesses, 
especially small ones, and its unique 
products and policies, as compared to its 
private competitors, provide more options 
for borrowers (Ascah, 2011). Finally, ATB 
makes significant efforts to promote itself 
within local communities by sponsoring 
various community projects and events and 
enjoys an overall high level of citizen 
support for this reason. Its current CEO, 
Dave Mowat, the former head of VanCity 
Credit Union, understands well the non-
commercial roles that large financial firms 
play in both the economy and society more 
generally.  
All three firms, to varying extents, 
transfer resources from their services that 
serve high density populations (usually 
urbanites) to support their operations that 
serve rural and small-town dwellers. For 
illustration, uniform province-wide alcohol 
prices (detached from transportation costs or 
localized market conditions) as well as its 
support of the (rural) Ontario wine growing 
regions, are politically significant benefits 
the LCBO provides to the province’s non-
urban residents. ATB’s (growing) urban 
operations, likewise, help  it to provide 
services to the province’s hinterland 
residents. Such internalized cross 
subsidization is at the very core of the 
political dynamics of BC Ferries and its 
monopoly position within a closed 
marketplace that allows it to transfer 
resources  from its revenue positive 
activities (in operational terms, at least) to 
fund services that would otherwise require 
an operational subsidy if the Crown did not 
exist. BC Ferries’ two most popular routes 
connect the mainland of the province to 
Vancouver Island, and route one and two 
each provide 40% and 22%, respectively, of 
its operating revenues (Coastal Ferry 
Services Contract, 2003: 1, 7). These 
positive operational cash flows are then used 
to help fund its other 23 routes many of 
which serve a relatively small number of 
individuals. BC Ferries also has well-
developed expertise in providing marine 
transportation and has the related 
infrastructure, ships, terminals, repair 
facilities, and the like that are necessary for 
operating a maritime transportation firm. 
But, it is the extremely high public profile of 
BC Ferries and its operations that shape 
much of the political dynamics of this firm. 
Any changes to its fares and service levels, 
for example, are met by stern resistance 
from a host of well-organized user groups 
whose concerns oftentimes are reiterated in 
the media. For instance, the Union of British 
Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) recently 
released a report criticizing BC Ferries and 
the effect its fare increases have had on 
ridership and overall economic activity, 
resulting in billions of dollars in economic 
losses for rural communities (UBCM, 2014); 
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the findings of this work were widely 
reported in the media; even a minor mistake 
by staff loading a ferry in the summer of 
2014   made it into the province’s 
newspapers (Chan, 2014). Its high public 
profile and the vital nature of the services it 
provides means that it is under an extremely 
intense public and media scope, and both it 
and its operations are a significant political 
liability for the BC government.        
Unlike ATB and LCBO, whose sales 
and revenues are on an upward trajectory, 
BC Ferries faces some very serious 
challenges. At the core of its problems is the 
declining number of users. Such a decline is 
largely due to a host of structural factors 
outside the control of the firm. For example, 
the effects of changing land use patterns 
(restrictions on development on the Gulf 
Islands has led to steep escalations in 
housing prices) as well as changing 
demographic factors (retirees replacing daily 
ferry using workers) pose a challenge to the 
corporation. Another important factor is that, 
as Vancouver Island’s population has 
grown, more services have become available 
to its residents that were previously only 
offered in the lower mainland.   
This reduction in users has had a 
profoundly negative effect on the 
corporation’s finances. In 1994, BC Ferries 
carried 21.5 million passengers and 8.4 
million vehicles, and in that year it 
recovered $277.1 million from its 
operations. To help cover its operational 
shortfall and capital expenses, it received a 
$17.9 million subsidy from the province and 
an $18.4 million subsidy from the federal 
government (BC Ferries, 1994). Twenty 
years later in 2014, BC Ferries transported 
19.7 million passengers and 7.6 million 
vehicles, receiving $180.1 million from the 
province and $28.4 million from the federal 
government - an increase of over 1,000% 
and 50%, respectively, from each level of 
government (BC Ferries, 2014). A few 
points are worth noting regarding these 
figures. First, the federal government’s 
contribution is indexed to inflation and thus 
provides a real comparator as to the 
incredible growth of the province’s 
contribution. Second, the rising provincial 
subsidy does not include additional moneys 
provided to BC Ferries in 2012 to stabilize 
fares, $79.5 million over five years (BC 
Ferries, 2013: 15). Finally, and most 
significantly, the provincial government 
assumed all of BC Ferries’ debt in 2003 
when it reorganized the governance of the 
firm and today it has its current debt load of 
approximately $1.6 billion (BC Ferries, 
2014: 62) and it is rising as the ferry 
company is permitted to borrow money on 
the bond market. One key reason for its 
increasing debt is that it continues to face 
significant capital costs as its fleet and 
terminals require new investments. Not 
surprisingly, its fares have risen sharply and, 
for instance, since 2003 the cost to travel on 
its major routes has increased 40% and on 
its minor routes they have gone up by 70% 
(Ferry Advisory Committee Chairs, 2011: 
2). With BC Ferries’ declining user rates and 
its very rigid cost structure - due largely to 
its organized workers, required staffing 
levels dictated by federal regulations, and an 
inability to reduce its schedule – has meant 
that its fares and service levels are largely 
determined by the amount of money the 
provincial government provides as a 
subsidy.  
While efforts have been made to 
reorganize how BC Ferries is governed and 
how decisions are made regarding its fares 
and service schedule (they are now 
determined by an independent body, the BC 
Ferry Commission), in an effort to try to 
insulate the government from negative 
attention such policies evoke, this has not 
been possible. As a result of the causative 
connection between the subsidy levels and 
the tariff rates in an environment of 
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declining user and a rigid cost structure, the 
BC government faces an impossible 
predicament in that it must provide an ever 
increasing operational subsidy as well as 
face the political blowback from rising fares. 
And given that there is no real viable 
alternative model - in economic as well as 
political terms - to the BC Ferries monopoly, 
and that it provides such an incredibly 
sensitive public service, the BC government 
has no alternative options. Making matters 
worse for the provincial government is that 
the current model of BC Ferries operating as  
an “independent entity” is financially 
unsustainable. In the near future BC Ferries 
will not be able to operate nor service its 
growing debt without a significantly higher 
subsidy from the provincial government. 
Sooner or later, the BC government will 
have to assume all of its debt and resume 
direct control of the firm and culpability for 
its financial condition. The BC government 
will be forced to fund this Crown and its 
capital acquisitions in a similar manner as it 
currently does for provincial highways and 
universities - directly from the provincial 
budget in annual allotments.      
Conclusions 
 Despite the challenges BC Ferries 
faces today and in the future, it continues to 
provide a safe means of marine 
transportation to the citizenry of BC which 
is its central political demand from the BC 
government; the 2014 ferry tragedy in South 
Korea illustrates how such concerns should 
not be taken for granted (Kung and Kim, 
2014). ATB Financial and the LCBO, 
likewise, continue to fulfill their political 
and policy demands from their single 
shareholders as well as providing high value 
to their citizen customers. These Crown 
firms, unlike their private sector 
counterparts that are focused on profit 
maximization, must balance a host of 
diverse demands that are not only 
inconsistent and contradictory in nature at 
times, but also stem from a varied number of 
sources: the public, various - and oftentimes 
powerful - stakeholder groups and their 
political masters. Remember that these 
companies face unparalleled levels of 
scrutiny when compared to their private 
sector counterparts, as they must adhere to 
strict transparency and accountability 
requirements. An omnipresent media gaze 
(oftentimes quite hostile) and Freedom of 
Information requests for internal documents 
are additional factors they must constantly 
manage. Yet, these firms continue to fulfill 
their objectives within their home provinces. 
As such, they stand as yet another testament 
to the dynamism of Canada’s public sector 
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1980 1,079 - 400 37.1 4.96 
1981 1,182 9.5 433 36.6 5.1 
1982 1,329 12.4 502 37.7 8.4 
1983 1,467 10 533 36.3 50.7 
1984 1,504 2.5 520 34.6 44.2 
1985 1,590 5.7 602 37.8 7.1 
1986 1,646 3.5 638 38.7 7.7 
1987 1,767 7.3 645 36.5 11.6 
1988 1,860 5.2 635 34.1 9.9 
1989 1,930 3.7 645 33.4 15.4 
1990 2,006 3.9 640 31.9 23.7 
1991 1,936 -3.5 650 33.5 29.7 
1992 1,833 -5.3 675 36.8 25.7 
1993 1,786 -2.5 615 34.4 21.1 
1994 1,764 -1.2 585 33.1 14.7 
1995 1,808 2.5 630 34.8 27.6 
1996 1,909 5.5 680 35.6 27.1 
1997 2,013 5.4 730 36.2 19.4 
1998 2,160 7.3 745 34.5 25.6 
1999 2,349 8.7 776 33.1 40.9 
2000 2,549 8.5 795 31.1 54.4 
2001 2,734 7.2 846 30.9 55.7 
2002 2,939 7.5 901 30.6 55.7 
2003 3,119 6.1 970 31.1 75.1 
2004 3,320 6.4 1,035 31.1 53.4 
2005 3,532 6.3 1,110 31.4 47.5 
2006 3,682 4.2 1,195 32.4 54.5 
2007 3,922 6.5 1,279 32.6 54.2 
2008 4,133 5.3 1,345 32.5 63.6 
2009 4,297 4 1,400 32.6 59.7  
2010 4,344 1 1,410 32.4 59.9 
2011 4,580 5.6 1,550 33.8 57.5 
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ATB Financial Operating Statistic, 1995- 2013 
 










1995 8.95 7.84 (57,437) 34,775 145 3,173 
1996 8.67 7.67 (27,648) 36,019 147 3,246 
1997 8.40 7.30 (151,975) (124,330) 147 3,268 
1998 8.72 7.46 (66,544) 85,434 148 3,161 
1999 9.02 8.03 44,148 110,692 148 2,493 
2000 9.92 8.93 272,368 228,490 144 2,505 
2001 10.91 9.55 434,107 161,469 144 2,675 
2002 11.42 10.40 592,033 157,926 145 2,714 
2003 12.09 11.69 790,937 198,904 145 3,194 
2004 13.03 12.13 962,961 172,024 147 3,258 
2005 13.84 13.13 1,150,274 187,313 148 3,454 
2006 15.87 14.84 1,348,995 198,721 150 3,814 
2007 18.25 16.99 1,623,383 274,388 154 4,332 
2008 21.17 19.44 1,668,452 29,985 157 4,764 
2009 23.88 21.60 1,758,684 6,412 164 4,870 
2010 22.57 22.53 1,809,357 127,470 165 4,958 
2011 23.98 22.94 1,960,000 198,516 167 5,363 
2012 23.7 27.70 2,300,000 244,800 171 5,250 
2013 27.3 33.9 2,600,000 276,400 171 5,055 
 
Source: ATB Financial. Various Years. Annual Reports. Edmonton: ATB Financial.  
 
BC Ferries Operating Statistics, 1985-2014. 
 




















$ (000s)  
Fed. 
Subsidy, 






1985 11,912 4,460 125,308 12,456 125,530 43,000 Included 43,000 N/A 
1986 12,169 4,524 146,245 68,219 134,900 40,000 Included 40,000 N/A 
1987 18,235 6,525 182,616 1,817 166,573 57,000 Included 57,000 2,300 
1988 17,014 6,491 176,083 9,292 168,488 57,000 Included 57,000 2,352 
1989 17,919 6,885 181,830 7,559 187,599 51,000# Included 51,000 2,537 
1990 19,229 7,499 246,189 17,117 215,212 51,000# Included 51,000 2,657 
1991 19,775 7,707 256,740 101,286 230,419 48,450# Included 48,450 2,808 
1992 20,518 7,965 281,169 217,767 250,901 28,147# Included 28,147 2,945 
1993 20,533 8,029 313,970 178,360 265,249 36,300 Included 36,300 3,097 
1994 21,529 8,383 355,983 64,171 277,122 17,900 18,400 36,300 3,140 
1995 22,021 8,398 350,535 20,251 320,336 15,947 18,005 33,952 3,159 
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1996 22,512 9,053 374,568 60,251 340,487 9,352 21,322 30,674 3,272 
1997 22,269 8,910 388,828 136,178 333,846 4,700 21,800 26,500 3,292 
1998 21,799 8,779 396,650 128,187 356,810 4,700 21,931 26,631 3,374 
1999 21,379 8,579 423,273 166,602 362,078 24,000 22,040 46,040 3,389 
2000 21,381 8,668 389,084 114,590 356,169 64,913 22,150 87,063 3,390 
2001 21,369 8,709 396,021 55,148 361,425 72,519 22,438 94,957 3,339 
2002 21,251 8,890 453,381 54,805 376,889 71,706 22,953 94,659 3,380 
2003 21,624 9,126 463,855 58,114 391,163 74,243 23,377 97,620 3,345 
2004 21,367 8,292 481,699 59,649 403,950 105,806 23,975 129,781 3,261 
2005 22,026 8,557 499,471 119,855 433,141 106,971 24,343 131,314 3,375 
2006 21,729 8,543 504,116 130,181 446,049 108,223 24,890 133,113 3,406 
2007 21,665 8,521 528,363 248,316 462,574 108,396 25,309 133,705 N/A 
2008 21,788 8,578 569,649 428,292 492,171 122,702 25,856 148,558 N/A 
2009 20,727 8,130 624,143 530,269 531,021 124,485 26,294 150,779 N/A 
2010 21,035 8,255 660,003 84,166 555,874 149,508 26,924 176,432 N/A 
2011 20,746 8,119 672,147 122,180 561,323 151,023 26,924 177,947 N/A 
2012 20,170 7,838 682,651 115,304 555,731 154,959 27,487 182,446 N/A 
2013 19,900 7,700 701,557 96,600 576,195 182,100 28,100 210,200 N/A 
2014 19,700 7,600 714,302 108,000 591,712 180,076 28,373 208,449 N/A 
 
                                                          
i
 Laux, Jeanne Kirk and Maureen Appel Molot. 1988. State Capitalism: Public Enterprise in Canada. Cornell 
University Press, Ithica, p. 202 
ii
 This paper is based on over 100 participant interviews with senior current and former executives of these and 
other Canadian Crowns, the ministries that oversee their operations and relevant stakeholder groups. The 
contemporary and inherently political nature of these entities make attaching direct attributions to particular 
statements and observations impossible, but if readers are interested in viewing a list of  research participants, 
they should contact the author at: m.bird@uwinnipeg.ca. The author would like to thank all participants for their 
time and insights since this type of work would be impossible without their contributions. The author alone, of 
course, is responsible for all statements, facts, errors and omissions that are contained in this present work.   
iii
 The Mercer Report is a most remarkable document in that it provides a detailed analysis of the problems that 
plagued the LCBO and it includes references to undue political interference in its operations. It  served as the 
blueprint for its organizational and governance reforms. It is the only document the author has reviewed that 
discusses politicized interference in a Crown’s operations.   
